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The Settlement of Nazi-era Litigation
Through the Executive and
Judicial Branches
By

Morris A. Ratner*
Efforts to recover stolen assets and to address Nazi-era human rights violations benefited from a confluence of events beginning in the mid 1990s. Researchers of the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. located recently
declassified documents in the United States National Archives detailing Swiss
accounts that had been in the names of Jewish victims. This produced renewed
interest in the recovery of these assets. Using this new evidence, a team of the
most experienced and prominent class action plaintiffs' counsel in the country
filed related cases' in 1996 against Swiss banks, including Credit Suisse and
Union Bank of Switzerland, and other Swiss entities to recover dormant bank
accounts and to press human rights and other claims against the banks for their
role in laundering gold and other assets taken from victims of Nazi persecution.
Several of the cases also sought to force the banks to disgorge profits they obtained from the Nazi slave and forced labor program. The cases were filed in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, a jurisdiction which had over prior decades pioneered the use of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 as a case management tool to permit the effective resolution of
* B.A. Stanford University, 1988; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1991. Mr. Ratner is a partner in
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP (LCHB), a 65-lawyer firm specializing in group and
class litigation, involving human rights, consumer fraud, environmental, employment discrimination,
and other subjects of litigation. Mr. Ratner, who works out of LCHB's New York and San Francisco
offices, is one of the court-appointed Settlement Class Counsel in the $1.25 billion settlement with
Swiss banks and other Swiss entities in In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d
139 (2000 E.D.N.Y). Mr. Ratner also prosecuted Nazi-era litigation against German, Austrian and
French entities and participated in multinational negotiations and was a signatory to agreements that
resulted in the funding of a total of roughly $6 billion (USD) in settlements with those countries.
LCHB partners Robert L. Lieff and Elizabeth J. Cabraser advised Mr. Ratner throughout the course
of the litigation and settlement of Nazi-era claims. LCtIB associates Caryn Becker, Karen J. Mandel
and Lisa J. Leebove, and staff member Joy Haynes, also worked on the Nazi-era cases.
1. The original class action complaints were amended and re-filed in July 1997 as four separate actions, consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
under Master Docket No. 96-Civ-4849: Sonabend, v. Union Bank of Switzerland; Trilling-Grotch v.
Union Bank of Switzerland; Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switzerland; and World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities, Inc., v. Union Bank of Switzerland. The consolidated case was captioned
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, Master Docket No. 96-Civ-4849 (ERK) (MDG), and is
referred to herein as the "Swiss banks" litigation.
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mass claims. 2 As discussed in more detail below, this litigation was followed by
the filing of similar class cases against German, Austrian, French3 and other European entities, all seeking to recover for Nazi-era misconduct.
The credible threat of an involuntary judgment posed by the class action
litigation combined with (1) intense media attention, (2) political pressure from
well-situated victims' advocates, 4 (3) the ongoing efforts of institutions such as
the World Jewish Restitution Organization, and (4) mounting public support
within Switzerland to face past wrongs, to produce immense pressure on the
Swiss bank defendants to address their liability. These pressures, under the guidance of an engaged jurist, the Honorable Edward R. Korman, led to a $1.25
billion settlement of the Swiss Banks litigation, using Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 to create
multinational plaintiff classes. The settlement was historic because it was the
first resolution of mass tort claims arising from Nazi-era conduct during World
War II.
The same factors that produced the Swiss Banks Settlement, to varying degrees, facilitated the relatively prompt resolution of class action cases against
German, Austrian, French and other entities that had potential liability for Naziera misconduct. In the German class cases, which were filed a few years after
the Swiss Banks litigation commenced, the defendants insisted on a resolution of
the litigation using the Executive Branch to reach an agreement between the
governments of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Most
of the Austrian and French claims were resolved on a similar basis, thereby
preventing substantial judicial involvement in the settlement of those cases.5
2.

See, e.g., JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LmGATION: THE EFFECT

OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTPARTY DEVICES

(1995).

3. German Nazi-era cases included cases against private companies for utilizing slave and
forced labor during the Holocaust, which were consolidated in In Re Holocaust Era German Industry, Bank and Insurance Litigation, No. 1337, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11650 (Aug. 4, 2000); insurance claims, consolidated into In re Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A. Holocaust Insurance Litigation,
No. 1374, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17853 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); and banking claims, In re Austrian and
German Bank Holocaust Litigation, No. 98 Civ. 3938, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15573 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2001). Nazi-era cases against the French were limited principally to banking claims, including Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). In total, during the period
since 1996, more than 70 class action Nazi-era cases have been filed and successfully resolved,
either through multinational settlements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, or pursuant to the Executive
Agreement mechanism described herein.
4. Former United States Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-NY), Chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee, and then-New York City comptroller Alan Hevesy were among the political
figures who most actively represented the interests of victims of Nazi persecution during the pendency of the class action cases.
5. See An Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future" [hereinafter German Agreement], at http://www.compensation-for-forced-labour.org; Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of France Concerning the Payments for Certain Losses Suffered During World War H, at www.civs.
gouv.fr/uk/information/washington0l.htm; October 24, 2000 Executive Agreement between the
Government of the United States and the Austrian Federal Government, at http://www.reconciliation
fund.at/en/index.htm. The predominant use of the Executive Branch as a vehicle for achieving settlements in the Austrian and French cases had two notable exceptions. First, certain Austrian banks,
including Bank Austria, that had been sued in United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York before the Hon. Shirley Wohl Kram, settled on a Rule 23 class basis for $40 million
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This article addresses some of the principal differences between these two
approaches from the perspective of fairness to the victims. Section I describes
the Swiss settlement and the role of the United States courts in overseeing and
policing the fairness of the settlement negotiations, the approval and evaluation
process, and settlement implementation. Section II reviews the role of the Executive Branch in the German, Austrian, and French cases. Section III explains
why victims were better protected by the Swiss model and why the Judicial
Branch is best situated to guarantee the fairness of the settlement of mass human
rights claims.
I.
THE SWISS MODEL: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION, GOVERNED BY

DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES

A.

Judicial Involvement In Settlement Discussions

Then-Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat (who ultimately was appointed as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, but who maintained his position in
the Holocaust negotiations until the end of the Clinton Administration), with
assistance from State and Justice Department personnel, served as a facilitator in
all of the negotiations to resolve Nazi-era class action claims. In the Swiss Banks
case, Mr. Eizenstat facilitated initial settlement discussions between the courtappointed Plaintiffs' Executive Committee (all of whom later became court-appointed Settlement Class Counsel) and Counsel for the defendant Swiss Banks,6

represented by U.S. Attorney Roger Witten from Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.
The Swiss settlement discussions, mediated informally by Mr. Eizenstat,
terminated in June 1998 when the Swiss Banks declared they would pay only
$600 million USD to resolve the litigation and declared that they would not
negotiate above that amount. 7 Plaintiffs' Counsel, including, among others,
Melvyn I. Weiss of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP, succeeded in
creating a consensus among themselves and, as importantly, among other victims' advocates in support of a settlement of no less than $1 billion USD.
Judge Korman actively monitored the litigation from the outset, appointing
the Executive Committee of Plaintiffs' Counsel to manage the case, and regularly meeting with the parties on procedural and other issues. Judge Korman
USD. See, e.g., In re Austrian and German Holocaust Litigation, 80 F. Supp. 2d 164, 180 (S.D.N.Y
2000), affd. sub nom.; D'Amato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d. 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2001). Two nonFrench banks-Barclays and J.P. Morgan-which had French offices in Paris during the Holocaust,
also entered into small Rule 23 settlements in Nazi-era class cases against French banks in Bodner v.
Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) and Mayer v. Banque Paribas, California
State Court Civil Action No. 302226, in San Francisco County. (Collectively, these cases are referred to herein as the French Banks litigation.)
6. Mr. Witten, who was subsequently retained to represent the "German Economy" in discussions regarding settlement of Nazi-era claims against German entities, was among the most forceful
advocates of minimizing the role of the judicial branch in the German negotiations.
7. The author participated extensively in the settlement negotiations.
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and Magistrate Judge Marylin Go 8 demonstrated a willingness to grapple with
the complex issues raised by the case, and were not overwhelmed by the sheer
volume of paper the defendants filed seeking dismissal. In May 1997 defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Swiss Banks complaint, or, in the alternative,
for a stay. The motions, supported by expert affidavits, argued that the action
should be dismissed because plaintiffs allegedly failed to state claims under
Swiss and international law, failed to join indispensable parties, lacked personal
and subject matter jurisdiction, and lacked standing. 9 The court heard a lengthy
argument on defendants' motions on July 31, 1997. At argument, the court
voiced concerns about the viability of certain causes of action, and identified
several additional legal issues that the parties subsequently addressed in posthearing memoranda.' 0 Burt Neuborne, the John Norton Pomeroy Professor of
Law at New York University and an active member of the Plaintiffs' Executive
Committee who was later appointed Lead Settlement Class Counsel, argued the
motions, which were under submission while settlement negotiations took place.
The court never decided the motions to dismiss.t1
Against this backdrop Judge Korman invited the parties to meet with the
court to revive settlement discussions. At the pivotal meeting, Michael D. Hausfeld of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C., speaking for all plaintiffs,
walked the court and defendants through a compilation of data suggesting that
the banks' potential liability was many tens of billions of dollars. Because of
the difficulty of reconstructing amounts improperly converted or otherwise obtained by the Swiss bank defendants from the bottom up by examining each
account and illicit transfer, plaintiffs' counsel and their experts attempted to estimate class damages by considering aggregate estimates extrapolated from available historical data. Of course, most of the persons entitled to that disgorgement
had perished in the Holocaust, along with most, if not all, of their potential heirs.
The passage of 50 years, during which the banks had obstructed efforts to remade records scarce and difficult to assemble to prove
cover dormant accounts,
12
individual claims.
8. Magistrate Judge Go was also assigned to the Nazi-era cases against French banks discussed in note 5, supra. Working with Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr., Magistrate Judge Go was equally
involved in the French Banks litigation, which was primarily resolved extra-judicially as discussed
below.
9. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. The suits were filed two years after the World Jewish Restitution Organization initiated
discussions regarding certain restitution issues. Such negotiations led to, among other things, the
creation of the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons (ICEP). ICEP, chaired by Paul A.
Volcker (and also referred to as the "Volcker Committee"), was established in May 1996 by the
Swiss bankers association, the World Jewish Congress and other Jewish organizations to conduct an
audit of the settling defendants and other Swiss banks to identify accounts from the World War 11era
that could possibly belong to victims of Nazi persecution. The Volcker Committee conducted what
is likely the most extensive audit in history, employing five of the largest accounting firms in the
world at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F.
Supp. at 151. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Volcker Committee prepared a 100-plus
page report which it released on December 6, 1999 (the "Volcker Report"), setting forth its findings
in detail, which included the revelation that approximately 54,000 Swiss bank accounts were identi-
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However, the top-down approach to the evidence articulated by Mr. Hausfeld was effective, and the court announced a range within which it thought the
case should settle. It did settle in that range, specifically for roughly twice the
$600 million amount that the banks had declared to be their final offer during
the settlement discussions mediated by Mr. Eizenstat. The court's involvement
produced principled settlement discussions, based both on an assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of plaintiffs' claims as well as on evidence regarding
defendants' exposure.
B.

The Court's Involvement in the Settlement Approval Process

The parties reached an agreement in principle in the court's chambers on
August 12, 1998.13 This agreement related only to the general scope of the class
release to be provided and to the overall amount of the settlement, i.e. $1.25
billion. It was left to the parties to convert that general agreement into a formal
and complete Settlement Agreement, which the parties presented to the court for
its preliminary review on March 22, 1999.14
The court followed the two-stage settlement evaluation procedure recom-5
mended by the Federal Judicial Center's Manual for Complex Litigation'
("MCL-3d') and relevant jurisprudence detailing the review of settlements under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).1 6 First, the court certified the proposed settlement classes
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b) and reviewed the settlement for the purpose of determining whether it had no obvious deficiencies, whether it was the
fair and reasonable to warproduct of collusion, and whether it was sufficiently
17
rant providing notice to the class of its terms.
The key terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement were as follows:
1. Settlement Fund. Defendants agreed to pay $1.25 billion USD.
2. Defenses Waived. Defendants waived potentially dispositive legal and
factual defenses.
3. Distribution. The Settlement Agreement did not preordain a plan for
distribution of the settlement fund. Instead, the settlement set forth a
mechanism for the development of criteria pursuant to which distribution and allocation determinations were to be made, with direct input
from all interested class members.
fled as having a "probable" or "possible" connection to a Holocaust victim. See http://www.icepiaep.org/final-report/.
13. Joint Stipulation and Order Provisionally Approving Material Terms of Settlement Agreement Reached on August 12, 1998, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, No. 96-Civ-4849, 1998
U.S. Dist. Lexis 18014 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998).
14. Id.
15. (3d ed. 1995) § 30.41.
16. Rule 23 (e) provides that "a class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without
the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
17. March 30, 1999 Preliminary Approval Order, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation
(No. 165).
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4. Settled Claims. In exchange for the $1.25 billion settlement amount
paid by the settling defendants, settling plaintiffs and class members
agreed to release settling defendants and other Swiss releasees of liability for any and all claims relating to the Holocaust, World War II, and
its prelude and aftermath.
5. Class Beneficiaries. The parties agreed that the settlement should benefit persons recognized as targets of systematic Nazi oppression on the
basis of race, religion or personal status. Accordingly, four out of the
five Settlement classes, defined below, were explicitly designed to benefit "victims of Nazi persecution," defined to include Jews, homosexuals,
Jehovah's Witnesses, the disabled, and Romani-groups recognized by
Nazi persecuthe United Nations as having been the targets of systemic
8
tion on the basis of race, religion or personal status.'
In its March 30, 1999 order, the court preliminarily approved the proposed
settlement and certified five settlement classes under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and
23(b)(3). The five settlement classes included: (1) a deposited asset class of
persons who were victims or targets of Nazi persecution and their heirs, who had
claims relating to deposited assets in Swiss banks; (2) a looted asset class, consisting of victims or targets of Nazi persecution and their heirs, who had claims
relating to looted or cloaked assets; (3) a slave labor class, including victims or
targets of Nazi persecution and their heirs, who performed slave labor for companies or entities that deposited the revenues or proceeds of that labor with the
Swiss Banks or other entities; (4) a second and distinct slave labor class, including individuals and their heirs who performed slave labor at any facility or
worksite owned or controlled by a Swiss entity (this is the one class that is not
limited to "victims or targets of Nazi persecution"); and (5) a refugee class consisting of victims or targets of Nazi persecution and their heirs, who sought entry
into Switzerland to avoid Nazi persecution and were either denied entry or after
gaining entry were deported, detained, abused or otherwise mistreated.1 9
In May 1999 after granting preliminary approval, the court appointed four
notice administrators to implement an international notice campaign.2 0 The
campaign involved roughly $6 million in paid advertising in newspapers in
40 countries and in multiple languages. In addition, the notice program involved
Internet (including a web site available in 20 languages) and public relations
outreach, as well as an intensive program of community outreach involving the
enlistment of thousands of local organizations in 100 countries to make direct
contact with even the smallest of survivor communities. 21 The notice provided
18. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 142-43.
19. Id. at 143-44.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., November 5, 1999, Report of Notice Administrator Jerry Benjamin on Organizational Outreach, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, (No. 354); November 5, 1999, Report of
Notice Administrator Todd B. Hilsee on Analysis of Overall Effectiveness of Notice Plan (No. 355);
November 5, 1999, Report of the Notice Administrator: Poorman-Douglas Corporation Regarding
the Implementation and Preliminary Results of the Notice Program (No. 356); November 5, 1999,
Report of Notice Administrator Katherine Kinsella on Roma Outreach Program (No. 359); Novem-

218

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:212

through these means, pursuant to the jurisprudence surrounding notice of class
action settlements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, informed potential class members of
the terms of the proposed settlement, the method by which they could make
objections or comments, the method by which they could provide suggestions
regarding allocation and distribution issues, and the procedures for excluding
themselves from the settlement to preserve their right to pursue individual
claims. 22 This notice was consistent with due process, as articulated by the
23
United States Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts. In response
to that notice, and as of May 8, 2000, approximately 243 letters had been received containing comments upon or objections to the settlement, and approximately 448 letters had been received containing comments on or proposals
regarding allocation or distribution. 24 Approximately 401 opt-out requests had
been received, a few of which were subsequently withdrawn and a percentage of
which were from persons who were not class members or did not understand the
nature of the request. Also, as of that date in excess of 550,000 persons had
submitted Initial Questionnaires, which was the suggested method for indicating
a desire to participate in any claims process.25
The next and final step in the class action settlement evaluation process was
a final approval hearing, also known as a "fairness hearing." Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e), the court held a fairness hearing in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York on November 29, 1999.26 The hearing was
open to all settlement class members. The court also conducted and presided
(by electronic hook-up) over a supplemental fairness hearing that was held in
Israel on December 14, 1999. The hearing was open to a random sampling of
Israelis who submitted initial questionnaires in response to the notice.27
"The central question raised by [a] proposed settlement of a class action is
whether the compromise is fair, reasonable and adequate." 28 This determination
the parties reach settlement
involves consideration of both the process by which
29
and the substantive terms of the settlement itself.
ber 5, 1999, Report of Notice Administrator Todd B. Hilsee on Paid Media Implementation (No.
360); November 5, 1999, Report of Notice Administrator Katherine Kinsella on Earned Media Program (No. 361); November 24, 1999, Update to the Report of the Notice Administrator: PoormanDouglas Corporation Regarding the Implementation and Preliminary Results of the Notice Program
(No. 406); November 24, 1999, Supplemental Report of Notice Administrator Todd B. Hilsee (No.
407); November 24, 1999, Declaration of Notice Administrator Jerry Benjamin Regarding Outreach
to Disabled Holocaust Survivors (No. 408); December 14, 1999, Update to the Report of the Notice
Administrator: Poorman-Douglas Corporation Regarding the Implementation and Preliminary Results of the Notice Program (No. 492); December 15, 1999, Amended Report of the Notice Administrator Todd B. Hilsee on Analysis of Overall Effectiveness of Notice Plan (No. 501).
22. See May 10, 1999 Order Appointing Notice Administrators, Approving Form of Notice,
and Notice Plan, Scheduling Exclusion Requests and Objections Deadlines, and Scheduling Final
Fairness Hearing, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (No. 277).
23. 472 U.S. 797, 105 S.Ct. 2965 (1985); see also MCL-3d, §30.212.
24. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 145.
27. Id.
28. Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982).
29. Id. at 73-74
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In its August 9, 2000 Corrected Memorandum and Order granting final
approval to the proposed settlement, the court evaluated the Swiss Bank settlement negotiation process and determined that it was fair. The court held:
Moreover, based on my extensive personal involvement in the process, I know
that the compromises were reached by the result of lengthy, well-informed and
counsel who provided
arm's-length negotiations by competent and dedicated
30
loyal and effective legal representation to all parties.
In evaluating the substantive component of the fairness determination, the
court was guided by the specific factors identified by the Second Circuit in City
of Detroit v. Grinnnell Corp.3 1 These factors, all or some of which may be
relevant depending on the case, include:
(1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction
of the class to the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of
discovery completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial;
(7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery; (9) the
fund to a possible recovery in light of all
range of reasonableness of the settlement
32
of the attendant risks of litigation.
33
Other circuits have articulated similar standards.
The court's evaluation of the settlement was both critical and constructive,
and resulted in several substantive improvements to the settlement. For example, the original Settlement Agreement provided for releases to a number of
unidentified non-party Swiss insurance companies. 34 At the fairness hearing,
the judge considered objections to the inclusion of insurers as releasees under
the Settlement Agreement. The objections related to the effectiveness of notice
to claimants against released Swiss insurers and the appropriateness of releasing
such insurers in the absence of a mechanism to pay valid Holocaust-related insurance claims as part of the distribution of the settlement fund.35 In response to
these objections, and with the urging of the court, the parties and major Swiss
insurers released under the Settlement Agreement, after extensive discussions,
agreed on a mechanism to evaluate and pay Holocaust-related insurance claims.
This agreement is embodied in Amendment No. 2 to the Settlement
36
Agreement.
Amendment No. 2 specifically designates up to $100 million USD (including up to an additional $50 million in new money provided by the insurers themselves) for the resolution of unpaid insurance claims. 3 7 The mechanism provides for prompt and fair consideration of all insurance claims, appropriate
multipliers for such claims, full cooperation of the participating insurers in pro30. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 146.
31. 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974).
32. Id. (Internal citations omitted).
33. Id.
34. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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viding relevant documentary material to potential claimants, and assurance of
payment from the settling defendants. 38 The amendment was made prior to the
date on which the court granted final approval, and was submitted to the court.
The court held in its August 9, 2000 Memorandum and Order granting final
approval:
The Amendment also contains a provision that acknowledges my power to order
participating insurers to disclose the holders of policies, with the consequence of
an insurer's failure to comply being the exclusion of such insurer from all provisions of the Settlement Agreement. My power to order such disclosure is subject
to the application of certain standards that are not inconsistent with the good-faith
duty of a releasee to make disclosures necessary 3to
9 permit class beneficiaries to
obtain the benefits of the Settlement Agreement.
Similarly, the court made clear its intention to police the administration of
the Refugee Class claims. In December 1999, the Independent Commission of
Experts (ICEP)-an independent group of internationally-recognized historians
chaired by Jean Francois Bergier established by the Swiss Confederation in
1996 to examine Switzerland's relationship with Nazi Germany (and referred to
hereinafter as the "Bergier Commission")-released a report (the "Bergier Report") indicating that approximately 14,500 applications to gain entry into Switzerland were rejected by the Federal Foreign Police, and that more than 24,000
refugees were turned back at the border or expelled during the war years. 4° On
March 31, 2000, the Swiss Federal Council authorized the Swiss Federal
Archives to release to the Special Master a list of persons denied entry into or
expelled from Switzerland during the relevant period.4 1 In its August 9, 2000
Memorandum and Order granting final approval, the court noted: "Ifit proves
impossible to assemble the information needed because Swiss entities (including
Cantonal entities) refused to provide information that they have in their possession that is needed for the fair administration of the Refugee Class, I will consider an application for modification of the enforceability of releases with
respect to those entities."42
With respect to the administration of the Slave Labor Class II, the court
expressed concern over the ability to administer that class in the absence of
information concerning the identities of persons who performed slave labor for a
Swiss company or its affiliates during World War II. In its August 9, 2000
Memorandum and Order granting final approval, the court held:
[T]hose Swiss entities that seek releases from Slave Labor Class II are directed to
identify themselves to the Special Master within thirty days of the date of this
Memorandum and Order. The failure of Swiss entities seeking releases from
Slave Labor Class H claims to identify themselves will result in the denial of a
against those entities to pursue such
release and permit those who have claims
43
claims independently of this lawsuit.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id., See also http://www.swissbankclaims.com/PDFsEng/Amendment2.pdf.
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
!d. at 161.
Id.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 162-63.
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The court noted that it was not altering the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Requiring minimal cooperation as a condition for a release simply meant
that a party who seeks to enforce a contract for a release extinguishing the
claims of a particular class, cannot in good faith withhold its identity from class
members, who need that information in order to claim benefits to which they are
entitled or which may reasonably be ordered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d). 44
The foregoing are examples of the ways in which the court was involved at
the settlement approval stage in guaranteeing that due process concerns were
satisfied so that the class members actually received bargained-for benefits that
justified the release of their claims. The process by which the court approved
and improved upon the settlement also demonstrates the effectiveness of class
member input in the settlement approval process. The court carefully considered class members' objections, and took them into consideration when making
its determinations regarding whether to approve and how to prompt the parties
to improve the settlement.4 5
C.

Court and Class Member Involvement in the Development of a
DistributionPlan

The negotiating parties in the Swiss Bank Settlement did not make the allocation decisions. Instead, the Settlement Agreement, 7.1, called for the appointment of a Special Master to develop a proposed plan of allocation and
distribution of the settlement fund employing open and equitable procedures to
ensure fair consideration of all proposals for allocation and distribution.4 6 Once
the parties negotiated the final disgorgement amount of $1.25 billion, all class
members were informed of the amount and asked to decide whether to stay in
the class and be bound by the settlement.47 Staying in the class required them to
trust the mechanism of allowing a court-appointed Special Master to recommend
the allocation plan with input from all interested class members in the decisionmaking process. The court held:
The appointment of a special master here also obviates the concern that hypothetical conflicts among class members relating to allocation and distribution would
require separate representation, and thus call into question the adequacy of representation. This is so because the class members represent themselves on this key
issue and have direct access to the special master and to me. The adequacy con44.
45.
46.

Id. at 163.
Id. at 145, 149, 160.
As the Second Circuit has recognized:
[t]he formulation of the [distribution] plan in a case such as this is a difficult, timeconsuming process. To impose an absolute requirement that a hearing on the fairness
of a settlement follow adoption of a distribution plan would immensely complicate
settlement negotiations and might so overburden the parties in the district court as to
prevent either task from being accomplished.
In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 145, 170 (2d Cir. 1987); MCL 3d
§ 30.212 (often the details of allocation and distribution are not established until after the settlement
is approved).
47. See May 10, 1999 Order Appointing Notice Administrators, Approving Form of Service
and Notice Plan, Scheduling Exclusion Requests and Obligations Deadlines, and Scheduling Final
Fairness Hearing, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, (No. 277).
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cerns that informed the Supreme Court's decisions in Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.,
527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999), and Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
48
521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (1997), are therefore absent from this case.
The court appointed Judah Gribetz, Esq., to serve as Special Master.4 9
As noted above, the vast majority of class members opted to remain in the
class, and trusted this procedural device as the means by which allocation and
distribution decisions would be made. A substantial number of class members
actually made specific proposals regarding allocation and distribution, all of
which were forwarded to the Special Master and to the court. 50
The work of the Special Master in preparing a comprehensive draft plan of
allocation and distribution 5 1 was intimately tied to the multi-phased notice program in the case. Initially, in the most intensive and costly of the three phases,
all class members were told of the settlement terms and informed how to provide proposals regarding allocation. Recipients of the first notice were also informed that to receive further notice of a draft plan of allocation once it was
prepared by the Special Master, they should identify themselves either by filing
an Initial Questionnaire or otherwise writing to the notice administrators. 52
More than 580,000 class members ultimately responded to that notice, and all of
them were mailed a summary of the Special Master's draft plan of allocation in
approximately September 2000. 53 Class members were given a period of time
within which to comment on that specific proposal. A number of class members
and organizations representing victims of Nazi persecution commented on the
draft plan. After a hearing at which the Court heard objections and argument
54
regarding the plan, the Court adopted the plan in its November 22, 2000 order.
The class members were then provided yet a third wave of notice, by direct mail
and through additional world-wide publication, announcing the adoption of a
final plan of allocation and distribution, and describing the procedures by which
claims could be made by each of the five different settlement classes, as well as
how insurance claims could be made under Amendment No. 2 to the Settlement
Agreement. Accordingly, class members had multiple opportunities in the Swiss
Banks settlement for direct and consequential contact with the Court regarding
55
allocation and distribution issues.
48. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
49. Id.
50. See Annex A to Proposed Plan of Allocation, Summaries of Proposals Received by the
Special Master, at http://www.swissbankclaims.com/PDFsEng/671622.pdf.
51. A copy can be viewed at www.swissbankclaims.com.
52. See May 10, 1999 Order Appointing Notice Administrators, In re Holocaust Victim Assets
Litigation (No. 277).
53. See November 17, 2000 Report of Settlement Class Counsel Regarding Implementation of
Notice of Proposed Plan of Allocation and Regarding Response of Class Members, filed by Settlement Class Counsel Morris A. Ratner, In re Holocaust Victim Asset Litigation (No. 847).
54. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, No. 96-Civ-4849, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20817
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2000).
55. The Special Master's Plan of Allocation and Distribution involved a rigorous analysis of
available historical data. The Special Master conscientiously based his proposals on the weight of
the claims, and on the evidence he collected during his intensive fact investigation, as explained in
the Plan. See Plan of Allocation and Distribution, at http://www.swissbankclaims.com/media/index_
media.asp.
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The Plan of Allocation and Distribution was subjected to yet an additional
level of scrutiny during the course of the Swiss Banks settlement implementation. Three class members appealed from the November 22, 2000 order of the
district court approving the Special Master's proposed plan of allocation and
distribution. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's approval of the
allocation plan, remarked favorably upon the Special Master's detailed recommendations, and rejected the appeal.5 6
D.

Court Involvement in the Settlement Implementation Process

Once a class action settlement is approved, courts remain active in the implementation and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement. The Second Circuit in In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,5 7 a products liability
settlement regarding injuries associated with the "Agent Orange" chemical utilized during the Vietnam War, set forth some useful guidelines regarding court
oversight of settlement implementation: (1) "[d]istrict courts enjoy 'broad supervisory powers' over the administration of class-action settlements to allocate the
proceeds among the claiming class members ... equitably" 58; (2) the district
court must "exercise its independent judgment to protect the interests of class
absentees, regardless of their apparent indifference, as well as protect the interests of more vocal members of the class" 59; and (3) the court has "discretion to
adopt whatever distribution plan he determine[s] to be in the best interests of the
class as a whole notwithstanding the objections of class counsel or of a large
number of class members." 6 The Second Circuit found that the district court
also had within its power: (1) the flexibility to "alter the distribution plan in the
future to simplify it more or clarify standards as concrete issues arise" 6 1; (2) the
freedom to determine an equitable allocation of the settlement fund without
resolving issues of causality 62 ; and (3) the ability to "'provide [ ]broader relief
[in an action that is before trial] than the court could have awarded after a
trial.' ,63 The district court's oversight duties endure "[u]ntil the fund created by
the settlement is actually distributed. '64
These principles have animated the district court's approach to the Swiss
Banks settlement. The district court has special masters to handle all aspects of
settlement-administration, under the court's continuing supervision and control.
For example, on December 8, 2000, the court appointed Paul Volcker and
Michael Bradfield as Special Masters to establish, organize, and supervise the
Deposited Asset Class Claims Resolution Process using the Claims Resolution
56. Friedman v. Union Bank of Switzerland (In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation), 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 17343 (2d Cir. July 26, 2001).
57. 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987).
58. Id.at 181.
59. Id.at 182.
60. Id.(citations omitted).
61. Id.at 184.
62. Id.at 183-184.
63. Id.at 185.
64. Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Tribunal.6 5 They have developed detailed claims guidelines and disseminated
66
claim forms to the class, which have been reviewed and approved by the court.
II.
THE GERMAN, AUSTRIAN AND FRENCH MODEL: SETTLEMENT

THROUGH EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, WITHOUT THE
STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARDS OF

FED. R. Civ. P. 23
The victims of Nazi persecution resolved their claims against German,
Austrian, and French defendants through a dramatically different process than
that described above with respect to the Swiss Banks litigation. The parties used
Executive Agreements to reach settlements. 67 The level of judicial scrutiny of
the Executive Agreements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) was limited and produced
no improvements to any of the Executive Agreement settlements involving German, Austrian, or French entities. Allocation decisions were not subjected to
public scrutiny or participation when they were made and were negotiated by
only the persons and interests that happened to be represented forcefully at the
political negotiations that led to the Executive Agreements, Finally, while attorneys for plaintiffs in litigation matters participated in the negotiations that resulted in the Executive Agreements resolving German, Austrian and French
Nazi-era claims, the role of plaintiffs' counsel in the implementation was minimized. There was no appointment of Settlement Class Counsel as we saw in the
Swiss Banks case to oversee the provision of notice and to coordinate with special masters appointed to administer claims. The Executive Agreement settlements have instead been implemented through boards often consisting of a
majority of persons who represent the interests of entities other than victims of
Nazi persecution. 68
65. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (No. 855).
66. See, e.g., March 18, 1998, Letter dated February 20, 1998 from Paul A. Volcker to Judge
Korman informing the court of the status of the work of the Independent Committee of Eminent
Persons, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation (No. 139); October 5, 1998, Status Report dated
September 16, 1998 submitted by Michael Bradfield and prepared by ICEP (No. 193); January 29,
2001, Letter dated January 18, 2001 from Michael Bradfield to Judge Korman requesting an extension of time for the publication of the list of accounts in Swiss Banks identified for publication by
the ICEP (No. 907); February 7, 2001, Letter dated February 2, 2001 from Michael Bradfield to
Judge Korman attaching a copy of the list of published accounts, the information booklet, claim
form and instruction sheet (No. 913); March 20, 2001, Letter dated January 23, 2001 from Michael
Brandfield to Judge Korman attaching proposed rules governing the claims resolution process setting
forth a framework for the claims resolution tribunals adjudication of claims made by victims of Nazi
persecution or their heirs under the claims program established under the Holocaust victim assets
class action litigation (No. 949); August 30, 2001, Letter dated December 26, 2000 from Michael
Bradfield to Judge Korman enclosing a binder containing an explanatory memorandum, tables and a
computer program printout setting forth a draft proposed budget for the Claims Resolution Tribunal
(No. 1064).
67. The author participated in the negotiations involving the Executive Agreement between
Germany and the United States.
68. See Annex A to the German Agreement at http://www.compensation-for-forced-labour.
org/English%20Home.html; Decree Creating a Commission for the Compensation of Victims of
Spoliation Resulting From the Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force During the Occupation, at http://
www.civs.gouv.fr/download/uk/decrees/10_09_99.pdf; Annex A to the January 17, 2001 Agreement
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A.

The Executive Agreement Negotiation Process

With the exception of the involvement of the court in the French Banks
litigation, the courts in which Nazi-era German, Austrian and French class action cases were pending had nothing like the intensive involvement that Judge
Korman had in the Swiss Banks litigation. Instead, the German, Austrian, and
French claims were resolved through a series of conferences and negotiations
organized by the United States and German, Austrian, and French governments.
These conferences resulted in Executive Agreements between the United States
and the settling countries and in the execution of "Joint Statements" by the negotiation participants, including plaintiffs' counsel.6 9
The German negotiations set the pattern for the process of reaching the
Executive Agreements. The parties held meetings on a regular and alternating
basis in Germany and in the United States. The participants included representatives of the governments of the United States of America, Federal Republic of
Germany, Israel, several Central and Eastern European countries, the World
Jewish Restitution Organization, plaintiffs' counsel (including the author), and,
depending upon the case, representatives of the private industry for financial
companies that were potential subjects of litigation in the United States.
Mr. Eizenstat represented the United States government in each of the categories of Holocaust litigation. There is no doubt that he played a critical and
constructive role in the resolution of these matters, and he deserves praise for
accomplishing what many persons thought during the course of these negotiations would be impossible, i.e., settlements. However, Mr. Eizenstat was not
acting as a judge, and he was therefore not charged with evaluating the class
action cases as litigation matters; nor was he limited by the substantial body of
case law under Rule 23 setting forth the court's role as guardian of the class
members. Instead, Mr. Eizenstat's job was to resolve what he viewed, at least in
part, as a political problem. Not surprisingly, the settlement discussions that resulted in the Executive Agreements in the German, Austrian and French cases,
though often principled, were also affected by political issues and pressures.
For example, the U.S. government promoted the 10 billion DM (roughly
$4.5 billion USD) settlement amount (one-half paid by the German government,
and one-half by the private German economy) as an appropriate amount for the
settlement of all Nazi-era claims against any German entity. This number was
not originally suggested by plaintiffs' counsel, and there is no evidence that it
bore any particular relationship to the value of plaintiffs' claims, especially as to
the property portions of the German settlement. 70 But, when Mr. Eizenstat (and,
indeed, then-President Clinton) announced support for that number during the
between the Austrian Federal Government and the Government of the United States of America
Concerning the Austrian Fund "Reconciliation, Peace and Cooperation", at http://www.versoehnungsfonds.at/vfdoc-en/exec-agree-en.pdf.

69. See supra note 5.
70. The slave and forced labor claims were settled on the most precise basis, with financial
amounts negotiated on a per capita basis; the property and personal injury claims were negotiated
more loosely, such that a wide variety of claims were discussed as a single bundle of claims.
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settlement discussions, it became a ceiling (and, ultimately, a floor), mooting
much of the discussion about the true potential value of property claims.
The German negotiations defined an alternative to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 class
action settlements which, after the Swiss Banks settlement was reached, became
the preferred method for settlement by the German, Austrian and French defendants in class action cases in U.S. courts. Instead of certifying a settlement class
and obtaining a class-wide judgment and release in exchange for the payments
made by settling defendants, the defendants in the Executive Agreement settlements received only the more limited legal peace that resulted from the United
States' filing of what are called "Statements of Interest" in legal proceedings
involving Nazi-era claims. The terms of the Statements of Interest, and the
United States government's obligation to file the Statements of Interest in Naziera cases, were embodied in documents titled Executive Agreements between
the government of the7 United States of America and the German, Austrian and
French governments. '
The German agreement is typical. It is titled an Agreement between the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the
United States of America Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future."'72 This Executive Agreement is referenced in the Joint
Statement on Occasion of the Final Plenary Meeting Concluding International
Talks on the Preparation of the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and
the Future," and was signed by all participants in the negotiations, including the
author of this article, on July 17, 2000. The Joint Statement expressly states that
the German Foundation is to be the "exclusive remedy and forum for the resolution of all claims that have been or may be asserted against German companies
arising out of the national socialist era and World War 11." 73 The Statement also
commits the plaintiffs' counsel that participated in the negotiations to dismiss
their class actions with prejudice on a non-class individual basis. This legal
peace was a condition precedent for the funding and implementation of the German Foundation Executive Agreement.7 4
The Executive Agreement, signed on the same date, explains how the
Statement of Interest is to be filed in pending and future Nazi-era cases against
German entities. In Article 1, the Federal Republic of German commits to provide "appropriately extensive publicity concerning" the Foundation's existence
and the availability of funds,75 and notes that the Foundation "will be subject to
legal supervision by a German governmental authority." 76
The Executive Agreement Annex A broadly summarizes the structure and
function of the German Foundation as for the purpose of making payments
through partner organizations to those who suffered as private and public sector
71. See supra note 5.
72. German Agreement, supra note 5.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The level of publicity was never defined to meet Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 or due process
standards.
76. German Agreement, supra note 5.
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forced or slave laborers and those who suffered at the hands of German companies during the national socialist era. 7 The Executive Agreement contemplated
the adoption by the German Bundestag of Foundation legislation that would
provide for a board of trustees consisting of an equal number of members appointed by the German government and German companies, and by other governments and victim representatives, except that the chairman was to be a person
of international stature appointed by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of
Germany. 78 The Executive Agreement made it clear that the Foundation was to
provide potential remedies to all persons who had any kind of Nazi-era claim
and to set forth specific funds to pay various broad categories of claims, such as
the 50 million DM amount that was to be set aside as a potential remedy for all
non-racially motivated wrongs of German companies directly resulting in loss or
damage to property during the national socialist era. 79 The Foundation legislation was to also provide for the establishment of a three-member committee for
property matters, which would have authority to adopt rules and procedures regarding the evaluation and payment of property claims. 80 Subsequent to the
signing of the Executive Agreement, the German Bundestag did adopt a Law on
the Creation of a Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and Future" which
did, on the whole, embody the principles set forth in the Executive Agreement. 8 '
From the perspective of the German companies, one of the most important
portions of the Executive Agreement was the portion that obligated the United
States government to file Statements of Interest in pending and future cases relating to Nazi-era claims filed in U.S. courts. While such Statements are not
binding on courts, they rarely fail to prompt dismissal.
B.

The "Approval" or "Evaluation" Processfor the Executive Agreements

The district courts that were presented with motions for voluntary dismissal
of the named plaintiffs' claims in the German, Austrian and French cases played
an extremely limited role in terms of the evaluation of those settlements. The
Executive Agreements called for dismissal of Nazi-era class action and individual cases, but they were not class settlements. The court was not being asked to
certify a settlement class, to release the claims of absent class members, or to
enter a class judgment.
The role of the court was limited by jurisprudence regarding non-class settlements and dismissals of class action claims. By expressly making itself subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), Rule 41(a)(1) appears to require a plaintiff to obtain
leave of court before voluntarily dismissing an uncertified class action. Because
voluntary dismissal of an uncertified class action does not preclude absent class
members from continuing to pursue their claims, a district court is generally
permitted to interfere with the plaintiffs desire to terminate the class litigation
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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on an individual basis on relatively narrow grounds. 82 First, district courts generally review non-class dismissals of actions initially brought as class cases to
determine that the dismissal is not tainted by collusion, such as might occur if
the named plaintiff and its counsel obtain exaggerated payments in exchange for
dismissal of the individual claim and abandoning class representation. 83 Second, district courts generally review to insure that pre-certification dismissal
does not unfairly prejudice absent class members by making it impossible for
them to pursue their individual claims, such as might be the case if the class case
were to be dismissed without notice, or if absent class members had been relying
on the pendency of the class case to toll the statute of limitations. 84 Given the
foregoing, it is not surprising that the case law on the role of the trial court under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) when confronted with a motion for voluntary dismissal
tends to address almost exclusively whether there was collusion or whether there
will be prejudice in the absence of notice to persons who would have been class
members had the action proceeded through certification. 85 When Judge Kram,
in considering motions for voluntary dismissal of the German Banks cases endeavored to provide a higher level of scrutiny of the actual substance of the
Executive Agreement between the United States and Germany, the parties in
86
that case were able to successfully pursue a petition for writ of mandamus.
The appellate court noted that the existence of the Executive Agreement persuasively established that the court lacked jurisdiction to set conditions on the dismissal of the claims in that case which would have required the German
Foundation to take any action with respect to the treatment of any of the
claims. 87
While each of the reviewing courts considered the Executive Agreements
that were reached between the United States and Germany, Austria, and France,
the courts had a limited ability to receive input from the beneficiaries or to
attempt to modify the agreements. Instead, each court was informed that an
agreement had been reached, that plaintiffs' counsel and the named plaintiffs (on
the whole) supported the agreements, that the agreements provided substantial
and immediate benefits, and that the settlements were not achieved by collusion,
did not confer disproportionate benefits upon the class representatives compared
to absent class members or in a way that would prejudice absent class
88
members.
82. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) and 23 (e); In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation, 109
F.R.D. 602, 607 (D. Del. 1986) (noting limited scope of analysis).
83. In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation, 109 F.D.R. at 607.
84. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1314-17 (4th Cir. 1978).
85. See, e.g., Diaz v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 876 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989);
Shelton v. Pargo, 582 F.2d 1298 (4th Cir. 1978).
86. Duveen v. United States Dist. Court (In re Austrian & German Holocaust Litigation), 250
F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001)
87. Id.
88. Interestingly, plaintiffs' counsel actually fared better under the Executive Agreement settlements; their fees were paid more promptly, and their individual fee applications were subject to
less public scrutiny than was the case in the Swiss Banks settlement. The German Foundation, for
example, made fee payments to counsel after fee applications were confidentially evaluated by two
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C. Executive Agreement Allocation Determinations
The German, Austrian, and French negotiations all had unique facts and
circumstances, but negotiations regarding allocation in each of those matters
followed the same essential pattern: fundamental allocation decisions were made
by the negotiating parties without input from affected persons, who would have
been class members had the cases been settled on a class basis. In the German
Foundation negotiations, for example, a dollar amount was first negotiated.
Once it was determined that the German litigation would be resolved for a specific amount, i.e., 10 billion DM or roughly $4.5 billion USD, the parties to the
negotiation then turned to the issue of how to allocate that 10 billion DM among
the various categories of victims. The negotiation participants understood that
the 10 billion would have to cover every category of claim that could possibly
be raised relating to the Nazi-era in order to justify the filing of the Statement of
Interest by the U.S. government to prompt dismissal of future-filed claims. The
negotiation process was affected by the dominance of Eastern and Central European interests in the negotiations. Two of the more prominent plaintiffs' counsel involved in the negotiations-Michael D. Hausfeld of Cohen, Milstein,
Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C., and Washington D.C. attorney Martin Mendelsohnrepresented the Eastern and Central European countries in the negotiations, and
the Eastern and Central European countries had government delegations at the
negotiations as well.
The slave and forced labor claims ended up consuming roughly 80% of the
value of the German Foundation funds. 89 This is explained in part by the fact
that unlike many categories of property claims, there had never been any restitution provided to survivors for slave and forced labor. The disproportionate payment to slave labor also reflects the fact that most survivors of the Holocaust at
one time were forced to perform slave or forced labor, and non-Jewish victims
of Nazi persecution who survived as of the date of the negotiations were also
often young forced laborers during World War II. Thus, the slave labor payment was in essence a way of uniformly distributing settlement benefits to the
vast majority of survivors. Almost every survivor who was entitled to payment
for a property claim was also entitled to a slave or forced labor payment. One
additional consideration in setting the amount allocated to pay forced and slave
labor claims was the fact that, unlike many categories of property claims which
were mainly capable of being asserted only by heirs (because the principal holders of the claims had perished), the payments to surviving slaves and forced
laborers amounted to direct payments to living survivors and therefore seemed
to have a peculiar moral weight and significance. It is also possible that the
slave and forced labor claims had a better chance of success in the class litigation in U.S. courts, but the strength of the labor claims relative to the property
claims did not determine allocation decisions and was not a prominent subject of
mediators, one chosen by the plaintiffs and one by the German government. It should be noted that
fee payments in all of the Holocaust-era cases were relatively modest.
89. See German Agreement, supra note 5.
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the negotiations that led to the creation of the German
discussion during
90
Foundation.
D. Implementation of the Executive Agreements
For slave and forced labor claims, allocation was relatively easy. In the
German and Austrian agreements, the payments were made pursuant to a
formula. For example, in Annex A to the Executive Agreement between Germany and the United States, Section 4, the amount to be provided to each category of eligible slave or forced laborer is expressly set forth, with each slave or
forced laborer being entitled to receive up to a specific portion (e.g., 15,000 DM
for slave laborers). Foundations that have existed for decades in Eastern and
Central Europe to provide benefits to survivors of Nazi persecution are distributing the money. 91 For Jewish survivors, the World Jewish Restitution Organization has continued to play a role in distributing these funds, and for non-Jewish
survivors outside of Central and Eastern Europe, the International Office of Migration has provided services relating to the distribution of slave and forced
labor payments. 92
With respect to property claims, the settlements have been far more difficult to implement. Most of the settlements were reached without negotiating
any detailed claims process. For example, in the German case, while substantial
amounts were allocated to pay property claims, claims for medical experimentation, and other non-labor claims, the claims guidelines have been slow to develop. The claim forms, to the extent they even exist now more than a year after
the German Foundation settlement was announced, have yet to be widely disseminated, and the vast majority of victims, who were the intended beneficiaries
of the property components of these settlements, have yet to learn how or if they
can make claims.
No court is monitoring the claims process to make sure that it is equitable,
and plaintiffs' counsel, except for Professor Burt Neuborne, who is a member of
the German Foundation Board, have been relatively disenfranchised from the
implementation process by virtue of the fact that they have no formal role.
III.
THE SUPERIORITY OF RULE 23 SETTLEMENTS

In the Holocaust and Nazi-era litigation cases, it is still too early to conclusively determine how the different models used to achieve these settlements90. The author, Morris Ratner, participated in the negotiations in Washington, D.C., Cologne,
and Berlin that resulted in the announcement in June 2000 of the establishment of the German
Foundation.

91. See, e.g., German Agreement, supra note 5. Claims program websites maintained pursuant
to the German, Austrian and French Executive Agreements can be found at the following addresses:
http://www.compensation-for-forced-labour.org (German); http://www.reconciliationfund.at/start_
en.html or http://www.claimscon.org (Austrian Labor); http://www.nationalfonds.org/english/index.
htm (Austrian Property); http://www.civs.gouv.fr or http://www.wiesenthal.com (French Banking);
http://www.icheic.org (Insurance).
92. Id.
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through the Judicial Branch and the Executive Branch-will play out in terms of
settlement implementation. However, the early indication is that the settlements
achieved through the Judicial Branch are better at guaranteeing the due process
rights of and fairness to victims who are the intended beneficiaries of these
settlements.
First, the Rule 23 settlement model has been more democratic. The extensive notice provided to class members in the Swiss Banks case gave them an
opportunity not only to comment on the Settlement Agreement itself, and
thereby change some of the fundamental terms of that Agreement; but, moreover, class members also had direct and substantial input in the shaping of the
allocation of the settlement fund once a settlement amount had been negotiated
by plaintiffs' counsel. Conversely, in the settlements negotiated by the Executive Branch, there were virtually no opportunities for comment or participation
by large numbers of affected victims, and notice by the Foundations has been
generally less intensive. The Executive Agreements were announced to the public after being approved by the Executive Branch and the participants in the
negotiations and without room for further substantive review or improvement.
The beneficiaries of the Executive Branch settlements had no input into the allocation process, except through the implementing bodies erected by governments
in connection with the settlements, such as the German Foundation Board,
whose connection with the victim groups can be described as attenuated at best.
Second, the Swiss Banks model, or Judicial Branch model, of effecting
mass settlements of human rights claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 is superior to
the Executive Branch model in terms of its ability to guarantee scrutiny of the
settlement negotiation process and of the settlement terms from a due process
perspective. When considering motions for voluntary dismissal pursuant to the
Executive Branch settlements, the various trial courts in which Holocaust cases
were pending did have the obligation to ensure that there was no collusion and
that absent class members would not be prejudiced by the dismissal of the
named plaintiffs' claims. However, this level of scrutiny was nothing like the
intense scrutiny provided in a Rule 23 class settlement by a judge charged with
evaluating the settlement pursuant to Rule 23(e) standards for class action settlements. Judge Korman, for example, looked not only for evidence of collusion
and prejudice, but also examined the process of the negotiations, determined that
potential conflicts had been eliminated by the appointment of a Special Master
to deal with allocation issues upon notice to the class, and helped the parties
refine the settlement terms to guarantee due process when objections were raised
that highlighted inadequacies in the settlement. Judge Korman was charged
with being the ultimate guardian of the class members' interests. The Executive
Branch, on the other hand, approached all of these settlements with multiple
objectives in mind. It was concerned not only with protecting the interests of
victims of Nazi persecution, but also was undoubtedly affected by its ongoing
diplomatic relations with foreign countries who were being asked to contribute
to the settlement funds.
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Third, settlements effected through the Judicial Branch have a greater
chance of being implemented fairly. In the Swiss case, Judge Korman has
closely supervised all aspects of settlement administration and has appointed
multiple settlement masters who report directly to the court to address the needs
of the different settlement classes, including due process needs for information
needed to make claims. Notice of the claims process has also been
comprehensive.
The Executive Branch settlements of Nazi-era claims may ultimately prove
to have fair implementation procedures. However, the process has been painful,
and there is no single arbiter such as a judge, who has ultimate control over the
process with an eye towards ensuring fairness to the claimants and the victims.
Instead, there are foundation boards and periodic meetings of representatives of
different interests, which have to date resulted in less notice to class members,
delayed development of claims guidelines, and other problems with which the
parties to these settlements are still grappling.
Finally, because of reporting requirements, settlements effected through the
Judicial Branch are more likely to be the subject of continuing scrutiny by class
members and the public. For example, in the Swiss Banks case, we have continuously updated the court with reports that are filed and a matter of public record
regarding the provision of different phases of notice. Similarly, the special masters have filed reports with the court regarding the status of their efforts during
the implementation phase. 93 While the Executive Branch settlements have certain reporting requirements built into them, the reporting has generally been less
detailed, and the reports are not as easily accessed by members of the general
public or victim classes.
The Executive Agreements reached between the United States and Germany, Austria, and France have produced substantial compensation to victims of
Nazi persecution and of the misconduct of private corporations during World
War II. However, the settlements reached in the United States federal courts
under judicial supervision have been more transparent and have better protected
the due process interests of the settlement beneficiaries.

93.

See supra notes 21 and 53.

